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On May 6, 2020, the Israeli Supreme Court rejected eight petitions against PM
Netanyahu’s rule as PM and against the unity agreement between Netanyahu
and his former contender, Benny Gantz (“the Unity Agreement”). The unanimous
decision was delivered by an expanded panel of eleven judges, who emphasized
that despite the severity of the allegations against Netanyahu, there was no basis in
Israeli law for disqualifying him.
The petitions raised two separate questions: first, whether a candidate who
was indicted for corruption could be entrusted by the Knesset with the task of
forming a government. The second, whether the Unity Agreement was illegal or
unconstitutional, and whether it violated public policy.
Background and Facts
The decision was the apex a long political ordeal. On March 2, 2020, Israel held
its third election within a year, after neither of the candidates for the office of prime
minister was able to achieve the majority required for forming a government.  A
month earlier, on January 28, 2020, Netanyahu was indicted for three corruption
allegation: bribery, fraud, and breach of trust. Shortly after the indictment, several
petitions were filed to the Supreme Court, requesting it to rule that an indicted
candidate could not serve as PM. The Court rejected the petitions, determining that
they were premature, as such a scenario has not risen. Israelis thus went to the polls
without knowing whether Netanyahu, should he be elected, will be eligible to serve
as PM. 
Following the elections, Gantz was able to secure enough support among MKs to
become the first to receive from the President the mandate to form a government,
as is prescribed by Israeli law. However, he failed to do so, and shortly upon the
expiration of the mandate, on April 16, 2020, Gantz and Netanyahu entered a unity
agreement to form a “National Emergency and Unity Government”. The agreement
was portrayed by both Netanyahu and Gantz as a necessity in light of the Covid-19
crisis.  
The Unity Agreement establishes a two-head, “paritetic” government for the period
of three years. It determines that Netanyahu will serve as PM for the first 18 months,
during which Gantz will serve as an “Alternative PM”, and that after 18 months,
the two will alternate.  The government will be based on two blocks, with each of
the two parties allowed to invite other parties to join “its” block. The first six months
(subject to extension) of the government were declared as an emergency period,
during which all legislation not related to the coronavirus crisis was to be halted, as
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were are appointments of public officials. In addition, the agreement includes articles
relating to respective membership of the two blocks in parliamentary committees,
a mechanism allowing a party to replace an MK appointed to be a minister with
a candidate from its own list, and a specific clause that determines that from the
beginning of July on, and subject to the consent of the United States, Netanyahu
could initiate annexation of parts of the West Bank. 
The agreement required substantive constitutional and legislative changes. Basic
Law: The Government was amended on May 7, 2020, a day after the Court’s ruling
was delivered, to establish the position of “Alternative PM” and entrench the central
aspects of the Unitary Agreement. It also determines that Basic Law: The Knesset
would be temporary amended, so that the next elections will take place in three
years, rather than in four. The Alternative Government Law (Legislation Amendment
and Temporary Order), enacted the same day, includes several additional minor
legislation changes needed to facilitate the Unity Agreement, as well as a clause that
regards the eligibility of lists that split from larger parties to receive party funding. 
The Legal Questions Before the Court
The Supreme Court hearings on Netanyahu’s eligibility were the climax of an intense
and long public debate. A few weeks earlier, Netanyahu’s opponents slandered the
Court after it intervened in the Knesset’s speaker refusal to convene the Knesset
for the purpose of electing a permanent speaker. On the other end of the political
spectrum, photos of social-distanced demonstrations, the protestors standing two
meters apart due to Covid-19 regulations, were circulated in the social media.  All
eyes were set on the Court, both metaphorically and literally: the proceedings were
broadcasted online live, as part of a new pilot program, and received an impressive
rating of a million views. 
The burden imposed on the Court cannot be over-emphasized. Netanyahu’s
supporters declared that disqualification of Netanyahu would amount to illegitimate
intervention in the people’s will. His opponents looked up to the Court as the last
resort, after disappointed from what they viewed as the caving in of his opponents,
including Gantz and Amir Peretz, who publicly vowed not to sit in a government
headed by Netanyahu.
Well aware of the significance of the moment, Justice Hayut, the president of the
Court, decided to hold the proceeding in an expanded panel of eleven judges. The
Court carefully separated the different legal issues at stake: first, it stated that the
topics that were under pending legislation would not be discussed, and will only
be reviewed once the legislation is completed. An array of constitutional and legal
questions was thus postponed to a later stage.
Several aspects of the Unity Agreement were amended during the intensive two-
day hearings. The judges were discontent with the moratorium on appointments,
and questioned its relevance to the coronavirus crisis. They also requested that the
government present its agenda to the Knesset upon swearing, and suggested that
several other changes be made, to which the respondents agreed. The decision
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thus focuses on Netanyahu’s eligibility, and the validity of the Unity Agreement as a
whole. 
The decision opens with the most contentious topic: Netanyau’s eligibility to serve as
PM. Basic Law: The Government stipulates the conditions under which a convicted
PM offence can be removed or should resign, but is silent on the status of an
indicted PM. Thus, there is no explicit prohibition in Israeli law on the eligibility of
an indicted candidate to establish a government and serve as PM. The Court thus
examines whether such prohibition can be drawn from other sources. The central
source, in this regard, was a past decision commonly referred to as the Deri-Pinhasi
precedent, in which the Court determined that a PM is required to exercise his
authority to fire ministers, and is obliged to fire indicted ministers. A similar ruling was
delivered with respect to a commission of a local municipality’s duty to remove an
indicted head of municipality. 
The Court rejected the applicability of these decisions. Framing the legal question
around authority of the appointing body, the Court focused on the Knesset’s
entrustment of the task of forming a government. While the precedents involved
the exercise of an authority that can be characterized, as least partially, as
administrative, the decision to entrust a candidate with the task of forming a
government was “distinctively political”. Judicial review of such decision, the Court
stated, was to be accordingly limited, and intervention was, in this case, unjustified. 
With respect to the Unity Agreement, the Court rejected the petitions, stating that
no basis for intervention was, at this point, found. It indicated, however, that several
aspects were premature for intervention, but raise concern. In particular, the court
expressed concern with respect to the prospect of diminishing representation of
the opposition in parliamentary committees and in the committee for the election of
judges, hinting that should this prospect materialize, it may trigger intervention. 
Strikingly, the decision was unanimous. Due to the strict timeline imposed by the
situation, only partial reasoning by President Hayut was published, and the decision
states that other judges may specify their reasoning at a later date. While these
separate opinions may include nuances, the ability to achieve a unanimous decision
is notable, as it is rare in such expanded panels. The lack of dissent voices, among
eleven judges, sends a strong message regarding the Court’s institutional position. 
Political Corruption and the Judicial Craft
The decision disappointed those who hoped the Court would block Netanyahu’s
continuing service as PM. In light of the long and ongoing attack on the Court by
political actors, which constantly undermine the Court’s legitimacy, one may ask
whether, and to what extent, this affected the Court’s decision. 
Although it may be appealing to argue that the Court was deterred from blocking
Netanyahu, this does not appear to be the case. Israeli law, which does state that
a convicted PM must resign following a final verdict, simply does not prohibit an
indicted candidate from being entrusted with the task of forming a government.
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The distinction between the authority to appoint and remove from office ministers,
and even the authority to remove from office heads of local municipalities, and the
entrustment of the task of forming a government by the Knesset is, indeed, justified.
The latter involves an explicit and direct act of the sovereign, and is, to a large
extent, the epitome of the political act in the Israeli context. The choice to intervene
in such act, in the lack of explicit constitutional grounds, would be unprecedented.  
It should also be noted that the decision does not shy away from expressing
discontent with the current political reality, and, more importantly, hints in more
than one place that is not the final word. The decision is carefully crafted to pave
the way for further review of the legal and constitutional changes enacted after the
decision was delivered, as well as of other various issues that may come up down
the road. Importantly, these may include any conflicts of interests that may arise from
Netanyahu status as an accused, in particular with regard to decisions relating to law
enforcement. The desire to maintain the possibility of judicial review of such issues is
a possible answer to the question why the Court simply did not declare the issue to
be non-justiciable.  
The decision is an important case study on the relationship between corruption and
democracy, and on the limits of courts in such context. Notably, both parties to the
dispute claimed to have “democracy” on their side. Netanyahu’s attorneys claimed
that court intervention, in what they argued was a clear expression of the people’s
will, would subvert democracy. The petitioners argued that democracy was founded
on the rule of law, which was threatened by Netanyahu’s continued rule. The court
refused to choose between these two ethos of democracy, with Hayut stating during
the hearings that “no fort will fall” should Netanyahu not be blocked.
The ability of Netanyahu to continue to serve as PM demonstrates that while
corruption has many legal facets, public tolerance towards corruption is, first and
foremost, a social issue. Courts are responsible for prosecuting corruption, but the
severity of corruption allegations depends not only on the penalty attached to them,
but also on their social denunciation by the citizenry. The ability of Courts to single-
handedly change the public and political culture, with respect to corruption, is limited.
It is perhaps most suitable to conclude with the words of Justice Amit, during the
hearings, to the petitioners’ attorney: “My lord asks us to issue a permanent order
making the world a better place. This is not among the remedies at our disposal”.
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